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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the performance trade-off when implementing a blockchain architecture 
for a cloud-based groupware communication application. We measure the additional cloud-
based resources and performance costs of the overhead required to implement a groupware 
collaboration system over a blockchain architecture.  
To evaluate our groupware application, we develop measuring instruments for testing 
scalability and performance of computer systems deployed as cloud computing applications. 
While some details of our groupware collaboration application have been published in earlier 
work, in this paper we reflect on a generalized measuring method for blockchain-enabled 
applications which may in turn lead to a general methodology for testing cloud-based system 
performance and scalability using blockchain.  
Response time and transaction throughput metrics are collected for the blockchain 
implementation against the non-blockchain implementation and some conclusions are drawn 
about the additional resources that a blockchain architecture for a groupware collaboration 
application imposes. 
Keywords blockchain, groupware, collaboration systems, cloud computing, secure messaging 
systems. 
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1 Introduction  
Group communication tools are increasingly used in work environments and can be 
characterized by many database changes that require fast, secure, and scalable message 
processing. These requirements can be a challenge to security and scalability. Are these aims 
simultaneously achievable in cloud-based groupware communication applications? If so, at 
what cost to system resources and performance?  
While group collaboration practices are intensifying in distributed teams, most collaboration 
tools such as Jive or Yammer or Slack1 are architected around a trusted central server (Beck et 
al., 2014). In order to reflect the changing nature of collaboration, decentralized collaboration 
tools are anticipated that are as secure as centralized systems, but without the need for a 
trusted third-party (Ciriello et al, 2018). This will – among other features – allow users to 
control their data, even take their data with them when they move to the next assignment or 
job (Tapscott & Tapscott 2016). One natural way of achieving decentralization in group 
communication tools and permitting finer granular control over private data is to organize the 
groupware application around a peer-to-peer blockchain.  
While blockchain promises advantages over traditional databases, for instance strong 
irrefutability, auditable data storage (Zyskind et al, 2015, Nakamoto, 2008, Fisher & Sanchez, 
2016) and without the need for a trusted third-party, however it also introduces complexity 
and implementation overhead. The strength of hardening data against tampering through the 
use of a decentralized ledger results in a performance and scalability challenge, mainly because 
of the overhead introduced by the consensus algorithms and the costs associated with 
distributing the ledger (Dinh et al, 2017). For this reason, it is important to better understand 
the advantages, disadvantages and costs of using blockchain in detail.  
In this paper we were interested in how blockchain-powered groupware collaboration 
applications scale? As this requires cloud-based performance testing, we also answer the 
question how scalability and performance are benchmarked in blockchain-
enabled groupware applications? The future objective of our work is to develop expertise 
that can predict performance impact and anticipate the resources needed to deploy blockchain-
enabled applications.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some background on blockchain, 
describing the mechanisms used in its implementation and summarizing the performance 
characteristics of various blockchain implementation alternatives. Section 3 presents the 
design science research approach that was followed in our iterative development and testing 
cycle. Section 4 discusses the architecture used and gives details of the implementation of the 
collaboration application. In Section 5, we present the measuring instruments and the various 
test scenarios. In Section 6, the performance results are presented, focusing on the key metrics 
of response-time and throughput at varying levels of resource provisioning. In Section 7 we 
confront expectations with the experimental findings, thereafter we analyze each of the results. 
Lastly, in Section 8 we conclude with a brief summary of the results, their analysis and our 
future plan of work. 
2 Blockchain Background 
Consensus algorithms are used within blockchains to ensure that participating nodes in the 
distributed network agree with the state of the blockchain when new blocks are added 
(Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). Blockchain consensus algorithms have the property of 
“Byzantine fault tolerance”, meaning that no single machine can succeed in a malicious attack 
on the distributed system (Lamport et al., 1982) without being ‘checked’ or ‘detected’ by other 
nodes in the distributed network. This is an important feature for a groupware communication 
                                                        
1 https://www.jivesoftware.com, https://products.office.com/en-au/yammer/, https://slack.com/ 
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tool because the architecture delivers strong irrefutability among the message group that, in 
practice, eliminates ex post facto amendments to the ledger.  
The first implementation of a blockchain in 2009 used the consensus algorithm ‘proof-of-work’ 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Since then, a variety of consensus algorithms have been developed and 
used, mostly variants of ‘proof-of-stake’ or ‘proof-of-authority’.  
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency powered by a blockchain that allows users to submit transactions 
without the need for a centrally trusted organization; this is achieved using ‘proof-of-work’ 
consensus (Nakamoto, 2008). The proof-of-work algorithm is based on one-way hash 
functions, where the only mechanism to recover a hash key is via brute-force, namely without 
strategy or heuristic, to generate and test permutations of messages until they match the hash 
value. This undirected search approach requires a large amount of computational resource 
(and therefore energy), resulting in slow transaction times and small throughput.  
‘Proof-of-stake’ is a less expensive consensus alternative to proof-of-work. Here, no brute-force 
computing is required to achieve consensus. Instead, the next node to create a block is selected 
proportional to its ‘stake’ in the blockchain. In cryptocurrency blockchains, the stake is the 
number of tokens a node holds - usually combined with how long they have been held (Bentov, 
Gabizon, & Mizrahi, 2016). In non-cryptocurrency blockchains, stakes typically do not exist. 
Thus, an authority is selected to add blocks to the blockchain, usually via a ballot or lottery, 
referred to as ‘proof-of-authority’ consensus (Knirsch, Unterweger, & Engel, 2018).  
 
Table 1.  Some blockchain frameworks and their performance claims extended from Buchman, 2016 
and Vukolic, 2017. 
All blockchains fall into one of two categories, namely ‘public’ or ‘private’ (Peters & Panayi, 
2016). Public-blockchains allow all users on the network to view the data stored, while private 
blockchains hide data stored on the blockchain between permissioned participants. Private 
blockchains can be either fully-private or consortium blockchains. Read/write permissions of 
a fully-private blockchain are controlled by a single organization, while consortium 
blockchains distribute read/write permissions across a permissioned consortium, which adds 
the extra security of decentralization. Thus, while the consensus mechanism for measuring 
blockchain scalability and performance is important, so too is the governance structure and 
decision whether to use a public permissioned/permission-less or private-consortium 
blockchain (Beck et al, 2018). 
3 Design science methodology 
For the development and evaluation of our groupware collaboration tool we follow a Design 
Science Research (DSR) approach (Simon, 1996). Like other prior DSR information system 
artefact approaches, we design, implement, and evaluate a new IT artifact (March & Smith, 
1995; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). In this case a blockchain-powered groupware collaboration 
tool, while simultaneously developing a method to compare the performance and scalability 
overhead to guide future blockchain systems design and evaluation (Gregor & Hevner, 2013; 
Gregor & Jones, 2007).  
MEDES ’19, November 12–14, 2019, Limassol, Cyprus Eklund and Beck
Framework Name Consensus Algorithm OpenSource Throughput (tx/s) Response time (secs)
Bitcoin PoW Y 3-5 > 500
Ethereum PoW Y 15-30 360
Ethereum Casper PBFT/PoW hybrid - ethash Y ⇡ 5000 unknown
Ripple RPCA (Ripple Protocol consensus Algorithm) Y 50,000 4
NEO Delegated-BFT Y 10,000 15-20
Hyperledger Fabric Kafka/Raft Y 80,000 < 1
Hyperledger Sawtooth Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) Y more than 80,000 < 1
MultiChain PBFT + MultiChain Y 1000-1500 5   10
Qourum Raft/IBFT Y 835 5
Tendermint Tendermint BFT Y 4,000-10,000 < 1
Red Belly Democratic-BFT N 660,000 2   4
Kadena Scalable PoW-BFT N 8,000 < 0.1
Table 1: Some blockchain performance claims, extended from [6, 8].
rarely get concrete details on the resources that provision the perfor-
mance tests, the nature of the tra￿c and load on the cloud-services,
or the geographic spread of the cloud resources. It seems most of
the tests are also conducted without the presence of deception on
the network, so we have no sense of how corruptible the protocols
are, and therefore no idea how robust or reliable the solutions –
compared to one nother – when prone to dec ption.
4 SMART CONTRACTS
In blockchain systems, consensus protocols are constrained by the
property of byzantine fault tolerance and while each consensus
protocol that we survey d claims thi property, the degree of e￿ort
required to subvert the blockchain varies, but is largely unknown,
untested or unreported.
While the blockchain as a data-structure looks to be an impreg-
nable point of entry for attackers, DLT syst ms – by virtue f very
di￿erent architecture to traditional centralized systems – are not
immune to n w and di￿ere t types of vulner bility. On the con-
trary, the highly decentralized architecture for the execution of
smart contracts exposes vulnerability at every consensus node that
executes an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) in Ethereum. It is
worthwhile therefore to explore the execution environment for
smart contracts because the p rformance and vulnerability of the
execution languages can give insight to performance, scalability
and security.
4.1 Smart Contract Programming Languages
Smart contracts are programs that run on the blockchain network.
Smart contract languages (a.k.a. called contract-oriented program-
ming languages) are programming languages that are used to write
or specify smart contracts.
Solidity is the pre-eminent language for Ethereum and some
other DLT platforms. Other programming languages can also run
on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)1. These include Python,
Go, Rust, Java Ruby etc. Solidity is believed to be the cause behind
the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) hack in 2016.
TheDAO, built on Ethereum,was hacked but not through tampering
1https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethereum-Virtual-Machine-
(EVM)-Awesome-List
with the Ethereum blockchain on which it ran, but rather through
an exploit of the EVM programming language Solidity that fooled a
smart contract into spending all its Ether. Solidity su￿ers from some
design ￿aws including batch over￿ow – if you over￿ow a number
it over￿ows silently and resets its value to 0, double-spending is
also possible, and unauthorized function calls can be inserted into
code.
Bitcoin Script language, the Bitcoin programming language, sup-
ports only conditionals, stack manipulation, hashing, and digital-
signature veri￿cation operations but no loops, thus all programs
halt and the language is not Turing complete. Ivy [11] is a higher-
level language that can compile to Bitcoin Script, the low-level
language used by the Bitcoin protocol to determine whether a
transaction is authorized. It is a stack-based language and limited
to Bitcoin capabilities, Simplicity [17] is a typed, combinator-based,
functional language without loops and recursion, designed to be
used for crypto-currencies and blockchain applications. Simplicity
is meant to replace Bitcoin Script, and thus allow for developing
abstract and expressive smart contract programming languages.
Flint [19], is type-safe, capabilities-secure, contract-oriented pro-
gramming language designed for writing robust smart contracts.
Flint allows programm rs to use caller capabilities to de￿ne access
control on smart contract functions. To prevent vulnerabilities relat-
ing to the unintentional loss of currency, transfers of assets in Flint
are performed through safe atomic operations. Formal modeling
and veri￿cation of smart contracts - e.g. F* [5] either using smart
contract source code or using their byte code helps avoid the ￿aws
existing in current smart contract programming languages and the
lack of practical programmer experience with contract-oriented
programming languages. On the other hand, there is another co-
hort who wants to use model-driven engineering to generate smart
contracts from abstract models cite (Towards Model-Driven Engi-
neering of Smart Contracts for Cyber-Physical Systems) to simplify
the contract modeling, and automate the source code generation.
4.2 Execution Environments
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is Turing complete 256 bit
Virtual Machine that allows anyone to execute EVM Byte Code.
EVM/Solidity are the most popular development combination for
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We follow a DSR approach because we aim for a methodological development and evaluation 
of an IT artifact, at the same time developing a way to compare the performance and scalability 
of blockchain-enabled applications more generally. We followed the guidelines for theory-
generating DSR by Beck et al. (2013) including (1)-(4) as follows, these steps are iterative (Beck 
et al., 2013). 
a) Creating awareness of the problem and suggesting an approach to solve it: Poor 
scalability and performance are two routine pitfalls using blockchain systems 
(Tschorsch and Scheuermann, 2016), this is partly due to the restrictions of the core 
technology, but the design and architecture of the underlying application can also 
impact performance. Our approach is to design the architecture and functionality with 
an emphasis on minimizing vulnerabilities exposed by the use of the blockchain. 
b) Developing the artefact: The application was developed iteratively, after each stage 
tested and evaluated and subsequent improvements made. The first iteration involved 
the architecture of the software, where the focus was on obtaining best performance 
and scalability by following common software patterns (Richards, 2015). The second 
iteration focused on creating the core functionality of the application using ‘Separation 
of Concerns’ (Hürsch & Lopes, 1995). 
c) Evaluating the artefact: After an initial development stage the architecture was 
evaluated and a decision taken on whether an alternative architectural pattern would 
be better suited. This architectural pattern revision took advantage of non-validator 
blockchain nodes, i.e., not every client participates in consensus-making. This design 
modification improved performance and scalability. After the second stage we analysed 
the core functionality, and pin-pointed bottlenecks based of micro-benchmarks of the 
blockchain technology used (Buchman, 2016). The evaluation of the core functionality 
led to the decision that using non-blocking (asynchronous) functions could circumvent 
validator response time, thus improving performance. Using asynchronous functions 
is a design choice that was well suited to this use case, but does not suit all use cases. 
d) Abstracting design knowledge: In order to accurately abstract design knowledge and 
measure efficiency, we created a tool to measure scalability and performance based on 
a performance testing methodology (Menascé, 2002). The measurement of scalability 
and performance can be subjective, depending on the underlying cloud-based 
infrastructure, thus we reduce this idea to an objective comparison between two 
systems: comparing an implementation without blockchain to a system with the same 
underlying infrastructure with a blockchain implementation. This allows us to 
measure the overhead of the blockchain relative to the base-line performance of the 
artifact with and without the features provided by the blockchain. In the following text 
we will explain in more detail the developed collaboration tool and how the 
performance and scalability tests are applied. 
4 Blockchain-based collaboration tool implementation 
The core functionality of the collaboration tool is powered by a RESTful API built in Scala 
which sends and receives messages between groupware clients, otherwise referred to as ‘the 
application’. The blockchain used in our experiment is the permissioned private consortium 
blockchain Tendermint2. Tendermint is a relatively lightweight blockchain solution. Its 
consensus method is ‘proof-of-authority’ using a voting mechanism (Buchman, 2016), as 
opposed to the more computational expensive proof-of-work made famous by Bitcoin.  
Two different node types exist in Tendermint, namely validator and non-validator nodes. 
Validator nodes are part of the consortium, nodes which vote to agree on consensus, while non-
validator nodes are restricted to reading and proposing transactions on the blockchain. All 
                                                        
2 http://tendermint.com version 0.9.  
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nodes in the Tendermint blockchain communicate over a persistent encrypted TCP P2P gossip 
communication protocol3.  
From a design perspective, a straight-forward method of using a blockchain is to store all data 
in the blockchain. Storing all data has one significant drawback; namely if all data stored on 
the blockchain is immutable, no data can ever be removed. This in turn causes the blockchain 
to grow so large that it can become impractical to store and distribute, particularly for a 
groupware messaging application.  
Growth of the blockchain is inevitable but the rate of growth can be managed. All data in our 
implementation is stored in MongoDB4, while only a hash-key of the data entries is saved in 
the blockchain. The hash-keys in the blockchain are used as a check to confirm the validity of 
the data stored in the database. For each individual data-entry retrieved from the database, the 
blockchain is queried with the appropriate hash-keys, thus confirming the validity the data 
retrieved from the database. A flag indicating the validity of data is always sent along with the 
message retrieved from the database. This approach to abbreviating the blockchain is a 
common idea among developers, particularly those building proof-of-concept blockchain 
implementations, but it is vulnerable since a malefactor can always shift their point of attack 
from the blockchain to the NoSQL database.     
In order for the application to communicate with the blockchain validator nodes, each 
application server runs a local version of the blockchain. This local version is a non-validator 
node synchronized with the blockchain, it pushes new transactions to validator nodes but does 
not participate in the consensus. This design was chosen to allow validator nodes to focus on 
adding transactions with consensus rather than responding to blockchain queries, which 
would otherwise slow the consensus. We adopted an asynchronous approach when pushing 
new transactions to the blockchain, this allows users to view transactions before the 
transaction is validated by all validators. When adding a new transaction, the validity of the 
transaction is checked by the local blockchain, returning true if the local blockchain verifies 
the transaction as valid. The local blockchain node ‘gossips’ with the validators with consensus 
being quickly found. Subsequently, the new transactions are added to the blockchain, after 
which the user receives confirmation that the transaction is validated (Buchman, 2016).  
5 Blockchain-based collaboration tool evaluation  
Collaboration tools are on-line services used by large audiences and are characterized by 
countless database changes, with the addition of other special requirements, such as the need 
for low response times and confidential data storage. These requirements prove to be a 
challenge to both security and scalability.  
Many commercial message-based groupware applications use blockchain (see Dust5, Status6, 
e-Chat7, and BeeChat8), some with the purpose of creating an immutable, distributed 
permanent record of communication and others with the intent of an agreed Peer-to-peer 
protocols for message deletion. Spasovski (with Andreassen and Lyck) developed dallr9 to 
create a simple intuitive platform with a flat learning curve to target small to medium sized 
companies. dallr is a groupware communication application that provides the platform for our 
empirical comparison. Two test scenarios are designed to simulate large numbers of users 
communicating via the collaboration tool. Performance and scalability are the two key features 
measured. Performance is evaluated via response-time, scalability under increasing load and 
the server resources consumed. The difference between the two test scenarios lies in the form 
or topology of communication between the users. The first uses a realistic messaging pattern 
                                                        
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gossip_protocol  
4 https://www.mongodb.com   
5 https://usedust.com  
6 https://status.im  
7 https://echat.io  
8 https://beechat.io  
9 https://bitbucket.org/nosaj/dallr-scala/src/blockchain-testing-tendermint-nonblocking/  
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based on a scale-free network (Barabasi et al, 1999). The second simulates a client-server 
topology where a single node (server/authority/command and control node) receives 
messages from the entire client-network.  
Each test scenario was run for 60 seconds including a 10 second ramp-up period in which all 
threads are started and thereafter run concurrently. The time-out for all requests is 20 seconds 
throughout all tests. Response-time and throughput are the preferred metrics to test both 
‘SendMessage’ and ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ functions. SendMessage appends a message to those 
previously sent. RetrieveAllMessages is the analogue of restarting the groupware client and 
reloading every message ever sent between two parties into the groupware application. Both 
non-blockchain and blockchain implementations are tested for each of the network topology 
scenarios, scale-free and centralised.  
We create the first testing scenario by applying network theory, specifically scale-free network 
theory to produce scale-free networks. We use the Barabasi-Albert (1999) model to produce 
power-law graphs using a Java implementation of the Barabasi-Albert model named 
GraphStream10. Each user is represented as a vertex and a message sent from one user to 
another is represented as an (undirected) edge. A node with relatively high degree of 
connectivity is denoted a ‘hub’. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the testing environment. 
The first test scenario receives the number of users as input and creates that many threads 
(users) that run in parallel. The scale-free network graph is loaded into the test which instructs 
each user who to message using the ‘SendMessage’ function. Each ‘SendMessage’ function has 
a 10% chance to trigger ‘RetrieveAllMessage’ function, followed by a 300-millisecond delay. 
Once the test reaches the end, it waits for (#users*2) milliseconds before restarting. 
We now describe the second scenario, namely 1 to n-1 (or centralized client-server topology). 
By forcing all users to send their messages to a single user (User #1), we replicate a heavy load 
onto a single user. By comparing the load on the heavily loaded user with the remaining users 
in both implementations, we emphasize the blockchain's ability to cope with centralized stress. 
The test takes the number of users as input and creates that many threads (users) run in 
parallel. Each user concurrently sends a message to User #1, using ‘SendMessage’, followed by 
300 milliseconds delay. Thereafter the user has a 10% chance to retrieve all messages using the 
‘RetrieveAllMessage’ function, followed by a 300 milliseconds delay. 
                                                        
10 http://graphstream-project.org/       
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As seen in Figure 1, all requests are sent using 10 slave test-machines controlled by the master 
testing server. Each slave concurrently sends requests to an ‘Application Load balancer’ which 
distributes requests across application servers. The blockchain implementation runs a local 
blockchain used to communicate and synchronized with the validator blockchains. A single 
database server is shared between all application servers. The tests, using Apache JMeter11, ran 
up to 800 concurrent users for over a minute. Microsoft Azure12 was used as the cloud 
infrastructure for all servers. The 10 blockchain validator nodes are deployed in three different 
geographic regions (Amsterdam, London and Frankfurt) on the DigitalOcean cloud13. In this 
way, we attempt to replicate the real-world, where the blockchain nodes would be distributed 
between a consortium of dispersed organizations.    
Buchman (2016) ran detailed tests on Tendermint showing that by adding more validators, 
this both lowers the throughput and increases latency. He first ran 64 validators and achieved 
throughput of 4,000 transactions per second with latencies of 2 seconds, and then 8 validators 
with 9,000 transactions per second and 1.5 second latency. The number of instances that run 
the application and local blockchain are the only factors that change within the testing 
infrastructure. The tests are run initially with one instance and the load gradually increased 
until results show average response times of over a second. After 1 second average response 
times appear, the number of instances is doubled and the tests are restarted and run until an 
average response time of over 1 second re-appears. This process is repeated until an average 
response time of over 1 second appears on 8 test instances. Both implementations are tested 
on 4 cloud configurations with of 1, 2, 4 and 8 instances. 
6 Discussion of Experimental Research  
This section presents experimental results in the form of line graphs focusing on system 
performance, measured in response times and throughput for different topologies and 
resourcing. Ramsay et. al (1988) famously noted negative user behavior with response times 
greater than 200 milliseconds. We focus on maintaining a response time of less than 200ms 
and do not display results over 350 milliseconds. We used line graphs for comparing 
blockchain and non-blockchain implementations in terms of different user loads using the 
scale-free network and 1 to n-1 test scenario. The two messaging functions tested in each 
scenario are the ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function and the ‘SendMessage’ as previously described.     
The metric to measure scalability is the average response time and throughput under an 
increasing user-loads. In our evaluations, ‘User #1’ represents the heavily loaded user that 
receives all messages in the 1 to n-1 test scenario while ‘User i’ represents each of the remaining 
n-1 users. The users in this test are represented as a rooted tree where each user is a node and 
each edge a message sent. The user receiving all messages is the root node of the rooted tree, 
all the remaining users are leaf nodes. This allows us to compare the average response times of 
the ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function being called on the blockchain and non-blockchain 
implementations. This evaluation illustrates how the two implementations handle the stress of 
a single heavily loaded user. 
We anticipated that the function ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ would be the bottleneck on the 
blockchain implementation. This is due to the large number of queries the blockchain performs 
within the function. The blockchain data is stored using Merkle-tree data structure, and thus 
it takes 𝑂(𝑙𝑜𝑔&𝑛) time to search a block containing n transactions. The function 
‘RetrieveAllMessages’ retrieves all the user’s messages (m) from the database, and then queries 
the blockchain. This implies a running time of 𝑂(𝑚	𝑙𝑜𝑔&𝑛) added to the database query. The 
send message function performs a single insertion to the database, as well as a single call to 
the function ‘InsertToblockchain’, the latter being a constant time operation. 
                                                        
11 http://jmeter.apache.org    
12  https://azure.microsoft.com/en-au/  
13 http://www.digitalocean.com  
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Due to the asynchronous nature of how the implementation adds messages to the blockchain, 
we expected the sending of messages to perform well. Insertion to the database is expected to 
be much slower than querying due to write locks on the database (Nyati et al., 2013).  
We did not expect to return consistent results due to unpredictable network traffic on the 
Microsoft Azure cloud that can cause unexpected response times and inconsistent latencies. 
Evidence of unpredictable network traffic on the Microsoft Azure cloud is visible and latencies 
throughout tests can randomly double over any 45 second period. A graphical illustration of 
our evaluation and measuring results can be seen in Figure 2 & 3. 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparing the throughput of ‘SendMessage’ and ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ functions on both 
Scale-Free & 1 to n-1 topologies and implementations (blockchain and non-blockchain) on a single D3 
(4 Core 13 GB RAM) instance. 
 
Figure 3: Scale-Free Network Test: compares ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ for both Scale-Free & 1 to n-1 
topologies for both implementations (blockchain and non-blockchain) on a one x D3 (4 Core 13 GB 
RAM) instance. 
The results scale linearly until they reach their threshold, and then have an exponential rate of 
growth. This is due to the time-outs when the implementation can no longer handle the 
transaction load at the given resource level.  
In most tests, the majority of reliable results are those under 200 milliseconds on average and 
the scalability of both implementations is linear. As a concrete example, a single instance of 
‘RetrieveAllMessages’ has a threshold of 50 users, whereas 8 instances can handle 400 users, 
namely the function scales linearly.  
We observe that the non-blockchain implementation can handle 4 to 8 times the load of the 
blockchain implementation before thresholding, and this blockchain tool incurs a penalty of 2 
to 4 times on response time. Results also showed that in the blockchain application the 
‘SendMessage’ function keeps pace with the non-blockchain tool. This is due to the 
asynchronous non-blocking design pattern choice our tool follows. The ‘SendMessage’ 
function does not wait until each message is validated and added to the blockchain before 
returning to work.  
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Figure 4: Scale-Free Network Test: compares ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ for both Scale-Free & 1 to n-1 
topologies for both implementations (blockchain and non-blockchain) on eight x D3 (4 Core 13 GB 
RAM) instances. 
We also conclude that the ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function on the blockchain tool has a tougher 
time coping with the same user load on the 1 to n-1 test scenario than in the scale-free network 
topology. All querying of the blockchain occurs through the local blockchain which cannot 
handle the load directed on a single user in the 1 to n-1 test scenario.  
 
 
Figure 5 (left) The ‘SendMessage’ function on 1 to n-1 network (Blockchain & Non-Blockchain) 
showing how the function scales over D3 instances 1-8 and (right) the ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function 
on 1 to n-1 network (Blockchain & Non-Blockchain) showing how the function scales over D3 
instances 1-8. 
The non-blockchain application has linear throughput growth throughout all tests while the 
blockchain application grows linearly until a threshold is reached. The throughput is throttled 
on both functions of the blockchain tool due to ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function timing out. The 
testing software is built to run on threads which disallow the test to continue until the time out 
is finished. The response time of ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ starts increasing dramatically from 100 
users which is where the linear growth of the throughput stops. In Figure 2 (right) it is visible 
that a blockchain root node has a polynomial rate of growth while the non-blockchain root 
node seems to be constant. The leaf nodes are almost identical regardless of the 
implementation. This proves that blockchains are capable of keeping up with non-blockchain 
solutions when they are not under heavy load.  
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Figure 6 (left) The ‘SendMessage’ function Scale-Free network (Blockchain & Non-Blockchain) on a 
single D3 (4 Core 13GB RAM) instance (left) and (right) the ‘RetrieveAllMessages’ function on a 
Scale-Free network (Blockchain & Non-Blockchain) on a single D3 (4 Core 13GB RAM) instance. 
7 Conclusion  
The paper shows that the blockchain implementation of a groupware communication 
application scales linearly as the number of instances is increased, until it reaches the 
throughput threshold. We also learned that using the Tendermint blockchain incurs a 4-8 
multiplicative factor on scalability when used with our cloud-based groupware application, and 
a multiplicative factor of 2-4 on the average response times and throughput in the application.  
These two findings imply that high throughput and low response times can still be achieved if 
enough servers are deployed to resource the groupware communication application. For well-
established companies concerned with transaction immutability and ledger security, paying 4 
to 8 times more in cloud computing costs is unlikely to be a concern.  
We have also shown that blockchains perform poorly when handling heavy traffic loads 
through single centralized users. This implies – naturally enough – that centralized topologies 
are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as denial of service, because they expose a single 
point of failure, which when placed under stress, has an amplifying effect in the remainder of 
the network. Indeed, such a network traffic model is better suited to a trusted 3rd party server 
model rather than a distributed ledger implementation.  
This paper reflects on the testing method for a single cloud-based blockchain-enabled 
application for groupware communication. The testing parameters are the number of 
applications, the quantity of messages sent and the topology of the message traffic. The 
resources consumed are in terms of servers and processes deployed, the transaction 
throughput and the network latency. The ambition of our future research is to provide a general 
methodology for quantifying and anticipating cloud-based resources and overall system 
performance when deploying blockchain-enabled applications. A further ambition is to use 
this experience to compare the performance when using different blockchain frameworks in 
applications. This in order to better inform developer choices. 
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